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Abstract 
What this essay is to discuss is Plato's theory of explanation in 
Phaedo. In this dialogue, we observe that Socrates criticizes 
both the natural scientists’ explanations and Anaxagoras’ theory 
of Mind since he thinks they could not explain all things, firstly, 
in a unitary and, secondary, in a real way. Thence, we are to call 
what Plato is seeking as his ideal explanation in Phaedo “One 
Real Explanation”. He talks at least about three kinds of 
explanation, two of which, the confused and foolish way of 
explanation by Forms and the explanation by Forms appealing 
to essence, are just "second best" and lower degrees of 
explanation. His ideal explanation is an explanation that can 
explain all things by one thing and in a real way. Though he 
cannot show, at least in Phaedo, how this One Real Explanation 
can work, we can see Plato completing his plan by the Form of 
the Good in Republic.  
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I 
Having discussed the immortality of human soul in Phaedo, Socrates 
asserts that their arguments do not prove the soul to be immortal but only 
being long-lasting (95c). He pauses 'for a long time, deep in thought'1 
(95e7) to find a way for the soul’s immortality. He knows that it is a 
crucial problem that requires 'a thorough investigation of the cause of 
generation and destruction' [ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς 
τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι] (95e9-96a1). Socrates’ wonderful 
keen for the wisdom of natural science, he says, was because he thought it 
splendid to find out the causes of everything, 'why it comes to be, why it 
perishes, and why it exists' (96a9-10). Socrates is thus searching for i) the 
explanation of everything and ii) an explanation that tells him about being, 
generation, and destruction of things. 
Based on what those natural scientists were to present, one simply 
can expect these from them: explaining all things’ being, becoming, 
generation, and destruction by one or more elements. Their explanations 
not only were not satisfactory but made him even 'quite blind to those 
things which he and others thought that [he] clearly knew it before' (96c3-
5). But why their explanations made him so? Let have a look at his three 
kinds of examples of what he had thought he knew before- but became 
blind to after their explanations:  
i) Men grow with eating and drinking. 
ii) A large man is taller than a small one by a head. 
iii) Ten is more than eight because two is added. 
All of these examples attempt to explain things through addition; in 
the first example, as he says, 'food adds flesh to flesh and bones to bones' 
(96d 1-2). We can see the same in other examples: the addition of a head 
in the second and of a number in the third. Actually he argues about 
addition after these examples: 
 
I will not even allow myself to say that where one is added 
to one either the one to which it is added or the one that is 
added becomes two, or that the one added and the one to 
which it is added becomes two because of the addition of 
the one to the other.(96e7-97a1) 
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II 
Socrates speaks implicitly about two reasons of rejecting such 
explanations. Their first problem, from my point of view, is that they are 
not Real explanations. He wonders because it is obvious for him that 
coming close to each other cannot be the true cause of two ones’ 
becoming two: 
 
I wonder that when each of them is separated from the 
other, each of them is one, nor are they then two, but that, 
when they come near one another, this is the cause of their 
becoming two, the coming together and being placed closer 
to one another. (97a2-5) 
 
The second problem arises when we use the opposite things as the 
cause of the same thing: 
 
Nor can I any longer be persuaded that when one thing is 
divided, this division is the cause of its becoming two, for 
just now the cause of becoming two was the opposite. At 
that time it was their coming close together and one was 
added to the other, but now it is because one is taken and 
separated from the other. (97a5-b3) 
 
By relating addition, or growing, to generation, division to 
destruction and twoness, or oneness, to being, we can find out how these 
examples can explain what was Socrates’ expectation from natural 
scientists, that is, the explanation of coming to be, destruction, and being. 
But they not only failed in giving one explanation for everything, but they 
did vice versa: they used the opposite explanations for the same thing. 
Two opposite things are at the extreme points of two-ness; in other words, 
there are not two things that are more than two opposites two. If we sum 
up these two problems of explanation, namely, problems of being a real 
explanation and being one explanation, Socrates’ main problem with what 
is called 'physical explanation' will be obvious. 
Calling it a “requirement” of explanation, Politis (2010:70) 
formulates Socrates’ problem as such: “if same explanandum, then same 
explanans” or conversely: “if same explanans, then same explanandum” 
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(Politis, 2010:70). Socrates’ reliance on traditional explanation, Politis 
thinks, was lost because he thought “such explanations do not satisfy 
certain fundamental requirements of explanation” (ibid: 65). Bostoc’s 
formulation of the case is nearly the same: “Two opposite causes cannot 
have the same effect” and “the same causes cannot have opposite effects” 
(Bostoc, 1986: 138). He calls them “two conditions which Socrates thinks 
any acceptable reasons or causes must satisfy”. (ibid) These are obviously 
some formulas that can be correctly said about Plato’s requirements or 
conditions of explanation but reducing the problem to this is misleading.2 
Socrates' disappointment with natural philosophers, I think, is due to 
the fact that they could not understand the necessity of One Real 
Explanation for all things. One Real Explanation is an explanation that 
can explain all the related matters in a unified and real way. Only in such 
a way we can understand the explanation and follow the argument. This 
may be understood better by what Plato has in mind when, in Sophist, gets 
the visitor to say that those philosophers 'have simply been talking their 
way through their explanations without paying any attention to whether 
we were following them or we were left behind' (243a7-b1). What is 
Socrates’ final decision about their explanation? Does he reject them 
completely? Does he think that they cannot be explanations at all or he 
accepts them as a low-level kind of explanation that, however, has some 
problems? Politis believes that physical explanations 'cannot themselves 
be explanations' in Plato’s view (Politis, 2010:112)  but they can only be 
'an element' in the explanation and 'can thus be accommodated within 
explanations' (ibid: 111). He thinks Socrates’ disillusionment with them 
must be understood as resulting not in his throwing them out, but in his 
settling them to one side, for the sake of first examining what an 
explanation really is (ibid:112). David Hillel Ruben, on the contrary, 
believes Plato could not think about those explanations even as an 
element. '[He] did not find them less than fully adequate, and in need of 
supplementation', he says, 'but rather entirely unacceptable' and Socrates 
knows that he does not want to follow this alleged method of explanation 
at all (Ruben, 2004:47). For this last comment he refers to 97b3-7 where 
we have Socrates saying: 
 
I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why a unit 
or anything else comes to be, or perishes or exits by the old 
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method of investigation, and I do not accept it, but I have a 
confused method of my own.  
 
We have already noted that Plato’s objection to natural scientists’ 
explanation was that they failed to suggest One Real Explanation. Having 
been disappointed with all those different incomprehensible explanations, 
the only thing that could make him hopeful again was One Real 
Explanation which he heard had been suggested by Anaxagoras’ theory of 
Mind (νοῦς). It was One explanation because it was saying that “it is 
Mind that directs and is the cause of everything” (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ 
δια κοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (97c1-2; cf. Diels-Kranz, Fr.15.8-
9, 11-12, 12-14). That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all 
things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural 
philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he 
speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to δια κοσμῶν τε καὶ 
πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸτὸν νοῦν εἶναι 
πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦν τα πάντα κοσμεῖν 
(c4-5), all emphasizing the cause of all things (πάντα). This may indicate 
that one of the reasons that caused Socrates to embrace Anaxagoras' 
theory delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by one 
thing. 
But it was also a Real explanation because it was something specific: 
Mind. The cause of his dissatisfaction with the explanation of becoming 
two out of coming together, as we pointed out, was that it could not be a 
Real cause. Why Mind, in difference with those unreal causes, can be a 
Real cause? Maybe because there is not, it seems at least at first, anything 
in the world more suitable than Mind to be the basis of explanation. The 
essential relation of knowledge and virtue or good and knowledge might 
help us understand the specific character of Mind. Trying to solve the 
problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable 
only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human 
beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, 
then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, 
we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate 
from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον 
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ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is 
nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing 
but knowledge (d6-8). 
Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to 
explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between 
Mind and the Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in 
Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ own theory because there are almost 
nothing about such a relation in the remained fragments of Anaxagoras. 
The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially 
compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and 
knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory 
of virtue as knowledge are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody 
who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, 
sofar as it is reason, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, 
when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it 
sounds to him like this: Good should be regarded as the basis of the 
explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the 
latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after 
introducing Mind: 
 
I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would 
arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best 
(ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause 
of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to 
find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, 
or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it 
befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, 
what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best (βέλτιστον). 
The same man must inevitably also know what is worse 
(χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) 
 
This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ 
Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found 
Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because 
of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is 
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so of necessity, saying which is better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better 
(ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3). 
On this basis, Anaxagoras could explain everything- that earth is flat 
or round, in the up or down or middle and if any of them, he would go on 
to show that it was better for it to be so. On the basis of his need for One 
Real Explanation, I think, we can elaborate why Anaxagoras’ Mind was 
so attractive for young Socrates. He emphasizes precisely on this point 
saying (98a1-b3):  
 
If he showed me those things I should be prepared never to 
desire any other kind of cause. I was ready to find out in the 
same way (οὕτω … ὡσαύτως) about the sun and the moon and 
…., how it is best (πῇποτεταῦτ᾽ἄμεινόνἐστιν) that each 
should act or be acted upon. I never thought that Anaxagoras, 
who said that those things were directed by Mind, would bring 
any other cause for them than that it was best for them as they 
are (βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει). Once 
he had given the best for each (ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον) as the 
cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he would 
go on to explain the common good for all (τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν 
ἐπεκδιη γήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν). 
 
What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what 
he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not 
be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain 
how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, 
that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had 
disappointed Socrates. Politis, conversely, does not accept that Socrates 
introduced this new method of explanation because of the fact that they 
were not good-based. 'Socrates’ complaint against traditional explanation', 
he says, 'is independent of and prior to his becoming hopeful about good–
based ones.' (Politis, 2010, 99) If we have to accept that what he means by 
‘good-based’ explanation is the same with what Socrates had in mind 
about Anaxagoras’ theory, Politis is misleading here. It is obvious that 
Socrates’ hope for Anaxagoras’ theory must be essentially related to the 
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fact that he is already disappointed with natural philosophers’ 
explanations. This justifies the suggestion to take that which is included in 
this new theory as the same with what was absent before. It is also 
misleading, I think, to call Socrates' theory teleological if we mean by this 
some kind of explanation that must be considered besides other kinds of 
explanation as, for example, Taylor thinks (Taylor, 1998, 11). If we 
behold the essential relation between the Good and the knowledge and 
observe the fact that the good is here considered as the basis of 
explanation, we cannot be satisfied with putting it as one kind besides 
other kinds of explanations. 
It must be insisted that we are discussing what Socrates thought 
Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ 
actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates 
found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the 
contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 
98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind.3 It was Anaxagoras’ 
fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-
99b). He 'made no use of Mind nor gave it any responsibility for the 
management of the things, but mentioned as causes air and either and 
water and many other strange things'. (98b8-c2) Socrates’ complaint 
against Anaxagoras, as it is obvious in the text above, is not against 
Anaxagoras as the creator of Mind, but is against Anaxagoras as a natural 
scientist who turned back to his predecessors' method of explanation. 
Socrates’ example of the explanation of his staying at prison, 98e-99b, 
confirms this.4 He asserts that when we make a mistake like what 
Anaxagoras made trying to explain by many causes, it is the ignorance of 
'true causes' (ἀληθῶς αἰτίας)(98e1). Socrates thinks 'to call those things 
causes is too absurd' (99a4-5), meaning by 'those things' all the things 
that, though are necessary for something as it is, they are not the causes 
of its being as it is. Though they are necessary, but are not the Real 
causes. We can clearly see his main concern about a cause in 99b2-4:  
 
Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause (αἴτιον 
τῷ ὄντι) (99b2) from that without which the cause cannot 
be able to act as a cause (ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐ 
κἄν ποτ᾽εἴη αἴτιον). (99b3-4) 
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We cannot call them causes and this name does not belong to them. 
They cannot be causes and explanations since they cannot explain the 
Good in what they want to explain. Socrates gives an example to show 
how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be 
wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words 
δέον συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good 
shows that he want it to have a unifying role: 
 
They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and 
holds them together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον 
συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται). (99c5-6) 
 
At the end of discussing what he would like to be the explanation but 
became disappointed with, he is still hopeful to find someone to teach him 
the workings of that kind of cause (99c6-8), probably showing that he was 
not thoroughly disappointed of finding the way of using good in 
explanation. It is on this basis that we say One Real Explanation is the 
highest degree of explanation for Plato. What he suggests later on as the 
explanation by Forms is only a 'second voyage' (δεύτερον πλοῦν) 
(99c9-d1). Whatever this ‘second’ might mean, as Hackforth notes, it 
must include some kind of ‘inferiority to πρῶτος πλοῦς.’ (Hackforth, 
1955, 137).  
Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good 
at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of 
seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo 
(99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation 
than its insufficiency, a difficulty precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-
505a, 506d-e). What is said in Republic can be regarded as compatible 
with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In 
spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the 
Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, 
even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it.' 
(505a6-7)  The problem that we do not have sufficient knowledge of the 
Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, 
that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself 
(506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good 
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with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the 
intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as 
sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so 
regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the 
sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our 
act of seeing. Being able to see everything in the light of the day, the eyes 
are unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without 
the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision 
any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about 
knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a 
required condition of any kind of knowledge: 
 
The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it 
focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, 
understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently 
possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6)5 
 
Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it 
with both aletheia and to on.6 He links them with the Idea of the Good 
when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy: 
 
That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the 
power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of 
the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ 
ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας)7 so far as it is known (ὡς 
γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4)  
 
Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are 
not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). What had 
been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly 
being asserted in Republic. The Form of the Good in Republic, of which 
Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle 
dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics 
and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said.  
Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea 
of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in 
the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to 
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understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and 
beautiful. (517b) Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it 
controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm. 
(517c) 
The same point is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, 
where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of 
X, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in 
its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, where Socrates says that the 
Form of the Good 'gives truth to the things known and the power to know 
to the knower'8, he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his 
epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are 
bound. This point is emphasized at 509b6-7: 'the objects of knowledge 
owe their being known to the good' (τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις … τὸ 
γιγνώσκεσθαι … ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι). Good, which is the 
cause of knowledge (αἴτιαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης) (508e3) and the Form of the 
good, as is said in book VII, is the basis of knowing and its meaning 
because you cannot know anything without finding it: 
 
Unless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the 
good from everything else, cannot survive all refutation (ὃς 
ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸτῶν ἄλλων πάντων 
ἀφελὼντὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν). (534b8-c1) 
 
This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of 
all knowledge or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated 
kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind 
of unity the Good gives to the different knowledge of different things is 
comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in 
Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the 
ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the 
Good. If we regard Aristotle's assertions that for Plato and the believers of 
Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that 
of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is 
to say, the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦτίἐστὶν, 988b4-
6: τὸτίἢνεἶναί) of the Forms, besides his statement that for them One is 
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the Good (e.g. ibid, 988b11-13), the relation between the Good and unity 
may become more apparent.  
Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than 
discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this 
binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy 
by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that 
the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is 
comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the 
visible realm (508b-c).  
The allegory of Line9 (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, 
tries to bind all various kinds of knowledge. The hierarchical model of the 
Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to 
understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds 
of knowledge by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of 
hypothesis starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a 
hypothesis that is not directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion 
(510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other subsection, to a 'principle which is not 
a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 'unhypothetical principle of all things' 
(ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) (511b6-7). This παντὸς 
must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm but to the 
sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological 
principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, 
bound and, thus, unified by. 
 
III 
To pass over that theory of explanation by the Good to attach a new 
theory in Phaedo, Socrates needs a new method, the method of 
hypothesis. This method is used to represent an image of what the real 
explanation is, enabling us to look at the real one. He describes this 
method as such:  
 
However, I started in this manner: taking as my 
hypothesis in each case the theory that seemed to me the 
most compelling. I would consider as true, about cause 
and everything else, whatever agreed with this, and as 
untrue whatever did not so agree. (100a3-7) 
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It is through this method that he comes to the kind of cause he has 
always been concerned about (100b2-3). Though his new kind of 
explanation is emphasized to be what he has never stopped talking about, 
I am not to agree with Bluck that in this coming to the theory of 
explanation by Forms, there is a transition from ‘purely Socratic thought 
to Plato’s own development of it’ because the theory of good-based 
explanation neither is less Platonic than the theory of Forms nor is in a 
lower rank. (Bluck, 2014, 14) However, Socrates knows that this theory 
can be used only when the existence of Forms has been accepted (100b7-
9). If we believe in the existence of Forms, there will be no better way to 
explain a thing unless by its Form: 
 
I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the 
Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason that it 
shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. (100c4-
6) 
 
He calls this theory simple, naïve, and foolish and emphasizes that it 
is not the way of the relation between things and their Form that is 
important for this kind of explanation but this very theory of Form as 
explanation (100d). He also calls this answer to the question of 
explanation the safest answer and impossible to fall into error. It is not an 
answer which makes us surprised, but the most predictable one.10He 
mentions the problem of the same explanations for the opposites again 
adding another problem which is the problem of explanation by the 
opposites: 
 
Bigger is bigger by a head which is small and this would be 
strange, namely, that someone is made bigger by something 
small. (101b1-2) 
 
Bostock interprets this as the third condition of explanation and 
formulates it as such: “A cause cannot be the opposite of the effect it has”. 
(Bostock, 1986: 137) We can also see this theory, for instance, in Timaeus 
29b5-9. The theory of explanation by Forms is the most possible 
consistent theory with this kind of thinking. The Forms are the only things 
that can be the aitia of things: 
 
232/ Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 12/ No. 24/ fall 2018 
You would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else 
each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular 
reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know 
of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in 
Two-ness, and that the things that are to be two must share in 
this… (101c2-6) 
 
Let us return to the method of hypothesis on which he based his 
theory of explanation by Forms. He told us that in this method we should 
take the most compelling theory as our hypothesis and then analyze 
everything on its basis: Whatever agrees with it will be considered as true 
and whatever not, as false. The theory of Form as explanation is his first 
hypothesis here and it is obvious that the theory was the most compelling 
theory for him. Now he says that before examining the consequence of 
this theory, you should not examine the hypothesis itself; and continues: 
'When you must give an account of your hypothesis itself, you will 
proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one 
which seems to you the best of the higher ones until you come to 
something acceptable.' (101d5-e1) 
Now we know that we should examine the consequences of our 
theory and be careful not to jumble the consequences and the hypothesis 
at once. What is the consequence of the theory of Form as explanation? It 
might have happened that one thing has two opposite Forms. Let’s see his 
example: 
 
If you say these things are so, when you then say that 
Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, do 
not you mean that there is in Simmias both tallness and 
shortness? (102b3-6) 
 
Thus, it is obvious that it cannot be an explanation of something just 
by referring to its Form because it can share many Forms and it cannot be 
meaningful to say something is so and so because it shares a Form and it 
is such and such because it shares another Form, the opposite to the first 
one. It is noteworthy that this is not the same with what we have discussed 
as a problem in physical explanation (the opposite things as the cause of 
the same things) but something different: the opposite things as the cause 
of opposite characters of the same thing. In the former case, for example, 
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addition and division were the causes of the same thing, two-ness, while 
here tallness and shortness are the causes of two opposite characters, 
being taller than Socrates and being shorter than Phaedo, in the same 
person, Simmias. While the first problem forced Socrates to look for one 
explanation for all things, this problem will make him distinguish between 
what is the thing itself and what it happened to have: 
 
It is not, surely, the nature of Simmias to be taller than 
Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he 
happened to have (τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων). Nor is 
he taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but 
because Socrates has smallness compared with the tallness of 
the other? (102c1-4) 
 
These are what happened for them to have and they do not have them 
because they are themselves as if these characters make their nature. This 
is only tallness that has tallness as its nature and only shortness that has 
shortness as its nature. Thus: 
 
Not only tallness itself is never willing to be tall and short 
at the same time, but also that the tallness in us will never 
admit the shortness or be overcome. (102d6-8) 
 
He concludes that the opposites themselves (not what have them by 
accidence) cannot accept each other while they are themselves. This leads 
us to a crucial point: only what that shares in a Form by its nature refuses 
its opposite, that is, cannot have it while it is itself. It means we can 
explain a thing by a Form it shares in only when it shares in it essentially. 
He says: 
 
It is true then about some of these things that not only the 
Form itself deserves its own name for all time, but there is 
something else- that is not the Form but has its character 
whenever it exists. (103e2-5) 
 
Every tall thing shares in the Form of tallness because it is tall, but 
only what has tallness in its nature can deserve the name of the Form 
essentially. What we have used as our example here, tallness, is his 
previous example and is not suitable to show what he wants to show us 
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because there is not or at least we are not aware of a special thing which 
has tallness by its nature except the Form of tallness itself. Socrates’ own 
examples are ‘fire’ and ‘snow’ which have hotness and coldness by their 
nature and cannot accept the opposite. We have, thereupon, three classes 
of things: Forms (hot itself); what shares in or has the Form by its nature 
(fire); and what shares in Form by accidence (every hot thing). It is only 
the second or what shares in Form by nature that refuses its opposite. It is 
in this way that Socrates solves the problem of explanation by Form, the 
explanation of two opposite characters of a thing by two opposite Forms. 
Everything that shares in a Form by nature is always called with that Form 
and can never be called by the opposite: It cannot 'admit that Form which 
is opposite to that which it is' (104b9-10). He uses the examples of odd 
and even: 
 
Consider three: do you not think that it must always be called 
both by its own name and by that of the Odd, which is not the 
same as three? That is the nature of three, and of five, and of 
half of all the numbers; each of them is odd, but it is not the 
Odd. (104a5-b1) 
 
By this method, he reaches to a necessary opposition between things 
which are not the opposites: 
 
Five does not admit the Form of the Even, nor will ten, its 
double, admit the Form of the Odd. The double itself is an 
opposite of something else, yet it will not admit the Form of 
the Odd. (105a6-b1) 
 
Now he can extend his previous safe and foolish theory of 
explanation by Forms (by resolving that problem of the explanation of 
opposite Forms in the same thing) and pass to another not foolish but still 
safe theory of explanation. (105b6-c6) 
Let us review what we have discussed above and summarize them: 
1. Plato cannot be satisfied with the natural scientists’ explanations since 
they have ignored to introduce One Real Explanation. 
2. That One Real Explanation, for Plato, is a theory that i) can explain all 
things by a unitary way of explanation, and ii) can do this with showing 
how it is good or best for them to be as they are. Plato was disappointed 
with Anaxagoras’ Mind because he did not show how Mind could satisfy 
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the conditions mentioned above (Anaxagoras used many other causes and 
did not use Mind to show how it was best for everything to be as it was). 
In spite of the fact that Anaxagoras made him disappointed, Plato did not 
leave the above conditions as the necessary conditions for an explanation. 
He had to come to other theories of explanation as 'second best' ones 
because neither he himself nor anyone else could show "the workings" of 
such an explanation. 
3. He represents the theory of explanation by Form as his own confused 
theory of explanation as the safest, but foolish. Having encountered with 
the problem of the two opposite Forms as explanations of two opposites in 
one thing, he used the leading point of the method of hypothesis that when 
you reach to a problem and want to examine the hypothesis itself, you 
should assume another hypothesis; and he came to distinguish between 
what a thing is by its nature and what it is by accidence. The result was a 
new theory of explanation based on the previous theory through making 
limitations on it: the theory of explanation only by those Forms to which a 
thing shares by its nature. He still preserves this crucial point that 
explanation should refer to the Forms. What is added to this point here is 
that he restricts and limits that theory to the Forms which refers to the 
nature of what is going to be explained. 
 
IV 
Finally, we turn back to our basic question: what is Plato’s theory of 
explanation? Does he have one unitary theory of explanation? Taylor 
holds that we cannot find a 'single principle' of explanation in Phaedo10 
Annas thinks that Plato’s argument in Phaedo is a mixed one because he 
could not distinguish between different meanings of the explanation 
which Aristotle did. She says that Phaedo is ‘a classic case of what 
Aristotle regards as confusion arising from failure to note that a 
philosophically important term is being used as though it had a single 
sense, whereas in fact it is crucially ambiguous’. (Annas, 1995, 25) She 
asserts that Plato is 'confusedly treating together different kinds of 
explanation' and continues: 
 
A grasp of Aristotle’s point in physics II3 would have 
enabled Plato to transform his confused discussion into an 
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unconfused discussion of three distinct kinds of explanation; 
but Plato shows no sign of any such grasp. (ibid) 
 
Vlastos, on the contrary, recognizes three kinds of explanation in 
Plato to show how he anticipates Aristotle’s doctrine: 
 
Plato has not only distinguished here mechanical from 
teleological causes…. but has also come within sight of the 
still more radical distinction between both of these and the 
logical aitia of classification and entailment. (1971: 166) 
 
He thinks that Plato’s use of that ‘safe’ explanation was in order to 
'explode pseudo–problems which arise when the categorical difference 
between logical and physical aitia is ignored' (ibid). Politis, on the other 
side, thinks that Plato defends a 'unitary account of explanation, i.e. an 
account that is supposed to be true of each and every explanation without 
distinction' (Politis, 2010: 98). For Politis, this unitary account is nothing 
but essence.11 He says that Plato cannot distinguish between the 
teleological and formal explanations because 'he thinks that all 
explanations are formal and essence-based' (ibid: 99). Politis holds that 
Plato distinguishes between those essence–based explanations appealing 
to the essence of the good and those that do not appeal to it and adds that 
'good-based explanations depend on essence–based ones' (ibid: 101) 
because it is necessary for good–based explanations, if they are to satisfy 
what he calls the requirements of explanation, to depend on essence–
based explanations (ibid: 101-102). He even says that 'good–based 
explanations are a kind of essence–based explanations' (ibid: 102). 
 
Conclusion  
What this article has been so far trying to show is that we have a unitary 
theory of explanation, One Real Explanation, which is good-based. Based 
on this ground, even if explanation by Forms appealing to essence may be 
a second ranked explanation, it must be regarded on the same principle 
(good-based explanation) and under his unitary theory of One Real 
Explanation. As White points out, ‘the second voyage will be directed 
toward’ the Good because otherwise Socrates' appeal to what is “best” 
would be misleading. (White, 1989, 166) This becomes more apparent if 
we pay attention to the relation of Good and Forms as is construed in 
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Republic or reported by Aristotle. Consequently, if we have Republic in 
mind, where the Good plays the causal role it were to play in Phaedo and 
is explicitly taken as aitia (cf. Herrmann 2007), the good-based unitary 
theory comes more apparent. If not, maybe we will not have such a single 
principle between One Real Explanation and explanation by Form and 
essence. In spite of the fact that we agree with Politis that Plato defends a 
unitary account of explanation, we have to disagree with his reduction of 
Plato's theory to the theory of explanation to essence since we must 
consider the theory of explanation by essence either as a theory that is a 
second theory lower than One Real Explanation or as a theory that will 
finally come along with it based on the relation between Forms and the 
Form of the Good in Republic.13 
In this way, we accept that One Real Explanation is an explanation 
which seems inaccessible in Phaedo while achieved in Republic. If so, his 
overall theory of explanation is that there should be one explanation for all 
things and this explanation explains the presence of good in them. In this 
interpretation, we must consider the theories of 'explanation by Form' and 
'explanation by Form appealing to essence' as the steps that cannot reach 
the One Real Explanation. Neither is the theory of explanation by Forms 
nor the theory of explanation by Forms appealing to essence are thus 
sufficient. They are some deficient stepstoward that One Real Explanation 
that cannot reach it by themselves, at least in Phaedo.14 If we add the 
Form of the Good as the highest Form which all other Forms share in, as it 
is said in Republic, and continue the method of hypothesis as it is drawn 
out in Phaedo, we will have, then, a complete theory of explanation by the 
Form of the Good and need only one more step: taking good as the 
essence of all the Forms or what all of them share in. Such being the case, 
our theories of explanation by Form and explanation by Form that appeals 
to the essence will be completed with the theory of good as the essence of 
all explanations15 and thus can be included in One Real Explanation. If 
this can be done, we may, however, be able to conclude that we have a 
unitary theory of explanation in Plato’s philosophy. 
 
Notes 
1. All the translations of Plato’s texts are from: Cooper 1997 
2. Politis says: 'It is of course true that, in this argument and its context (i.e. 98b7 
– 99c6), Socrates objects to physicalist explanations. But his grounds for 
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objecting are precisely that physicalist explanations do not satisfy those 
requirements of explanation….' (Politis, 2010: 73) 
3. Thinking that Socrates’ disappointment with Anaxagoras’ Theory of Mind was 
because of his disappointment with what is called good–based explanation is 
misleading. Politis, for instance, says: 'It is equally true that his hope to the extent 
that they were founded in good-based explanation traditionally available, were 
dashed (98b7), and as a result, “he turned to essence-based or form-based 
explanations.' (Politis, 2010: 75) 
4. His analogy of mind as a Real and necessary explanation of his staying in 
prison with Anaxagoras’ explanation of everything by Mind is so noticeable. 
5. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that evidently and deliberately 
extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological scene: 
You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of 
being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) 
This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to 
being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same 
role in the intelligible realm (b6-10): 
Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known 
(γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being 
(οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and 
power. 
6. The relation of the Good, on the one hand, and being and truth, on the other 
hand, remains ambiguous at least in Republic. All that we hear from Plato here is 
that the Good is beyond them. I cannot understand what kind of evidence Cynthia 
Hampton had to conclude that truth in Republic is 'likewise a Form and a part of 
the Good' and also an 'ontological notion' (Hampton, 1998, 239). 
7. One might agree with Politis that by the things that are capable of being 
known, Plato has in mind, 'at least primarily', the other ideas (2010, 102). 
Cooper's translation (ed.) of ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ ('it is an object 
of knowledge') cannot be satisfactory.  
8. I agree with Politis that 'It is natural to suppose that by the things that are 
capable of being known, he has in mind (at least primarily) the other ideas or 
forms' (Politis, 2010: 102). But it does not matter for us to make the good or the 
form of the good as the aitia of either a thing or a form. What is crucial here is 
that good is the meaning of knowledge whether in things or in Forms. He refuses 
these two objection, 1) 'Phaedo’s account is about the αἴτια of changeable things' 
(ibid: 103) and 2) 'It is about formal αἴτια, not the teleological ones' (ibid). 
9. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can 
be taken as evidence. 
10. Cf. for example: Euthyphro 10b, Hippias Major 287c, 294 b 
11. He says: 'Since we have been unable to find any single principle of 
explanation in the Phaedo, it is natural to inquire just what the similarities are 
between the kinds of explanation found there and Aristotle’s explanation by 
means of formal cause.' (Taylor 1998:11) He finds Plato’s theory of explanation 
in Republic in this way: 'On the whole I am inclined to guess that he thought that 
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in that area two explanations must ultimately refer to the Forms, but the only 
support for that opinion which occurs to me is the reference at Republic 511b 6-7 
to the ‘un-hypothetical first principle of everything' which implies that there is a 
single pattern of explanation for all phenomena, depending on a single principle 
which seems either to be identical with or to be some proposition concerning the 
Form of the Good.' (ibid: 5) 
12. Politis thinks that Socrates’ account of explanation 'is not that explanatia 
which are simply essences, but that explanatia, whatever else they may involve, 
are primarily essences'. (Politis, 2010: 64) He says that Plato generates the theory 
of essence by his theory of explanation and also points out that 'the account of 
explanation is sufficient to generate a particular account of essence'. (ibid: 66) He 
argues that the existence of essence is necessary for the possibility of explanation: 
'only if there are essences, can there be an explanation (αἴτια) of why a thing is 
as it is.' (ibid: 90) and: 'the account of explanation serves to develop an account of 
essence'. (ibid) It is more pleasant for him to prefer what he calls a stronger 
reading of the relation of the theory of essence and the theory of explanation, that 
is: “Part of what it is to be an essence is that essence plays this role in 
explanation, i.e. the role of being the primary explanatia”. (ibid: 91) Although he 
hesitates that his interpretation of the case in Phaedo can provide this stronger 
reading, he continues: 'What it may or may not allow us to conclude is that Plato 
thinks essences are, essentially, explanations – that it is part of what it is to be an 
essence that essences are explanations.' (ibid) He also tries to interpret Form and 
essence through each other: 'Forms in the Phaedo, whatever else they also are, are 
essences as well. And the theory of Forms, whatever else it also is, is also a 
theory of essence.' (ibid: 92) 
13. That what this relation may be is a matter of confusion. The most remarkable 
and even strange suggestion is that of Fine. She thinks that the Form of the Good 
is not a distinct Form but ‘the teleological structure of things; individual Forms 
are its parts, and particular sensible objects instantiate it’ (Fine, 1999, 228). This 
makes the problem of the causal relation between the Form of the Good and other 
Forms even more problematic. To say, like Seel, that the Form of the Good is ‘the 
cause of the existence of the essences’ (Seel, 2007, 185) does not explain their 
epistemological relation. 
14. Plato's εἰκός λόγος on which he emphasizes severally in Timaeus, can be 
regarded as an approval of degrees of explanation. Though Ashbaugh’s statement 
about likely account is not proving degrees of explanation but is notable: 'To be 
an eikōs logos is already to have as much closeness to truth as images can have. 
Such explanations completely fulfill the criterion of being true to something and 
in addition, they have the power to bring to mind the truth they mirror'. 
(Ashbaugh, 1988: 33)   
15 Politis says: 'There appears to be no problem with thinking that the claim that 
the idea of the good is the αἴτια of the other ideas [in Republic] can be directly 
accommodated within the account of explanation of Phaedo.' (ibid) 
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